The Hazard Detection System (HDS) is a component of the ALHAT (Autonomous Landing and Hazard Avoidance Technology) sensor suite, which together provide a lander Guidance, Navigation and Control (GN&C) system with the relevant measurements necessary to enable safe precision landing under any lighting conditions. The HDS consists of a stand-alone compute element (CE), an Inertial Measurement Unit (IMU), and a gimbaled flash LIDAR sensor that are used, in real-time, to generate a Digital Elevation Map (DEM) of the landing terrain, detect candidate safe landing sites for the vehicle through Hazard Detection (HD), and generate hazard-relative navigation (HRN) measurements used for safe precision landing. Following an extensive ground and helicopter test campaign, ALHAT was integrated onto the Morpheus rocket-powered terrestrial test vehicle in March 2014. Morpheus and ALHAT then performed five successful free flights at the simulated lunar hazard field constructed at the Shuttle Landing Facility (SLF) at Kennedy Space Center, for the first time testing the full system on a lunar-like approach geometry in a relevant dynamic environment. During these flights, the HDS successfully generated DEMs, correctly identified safe landing sites and provided HRN measurements to the vehicle, marking the first autonomous landing of a NASA rocket-powered vehicle in hazardous terrain. This paper provides a brief overview of the HDS architecture and describes its in-flight performance.
I. Introduction
Since 2006, the cross-NASA center ALHAT project has been conducting focused technology development for sensors systems and associated algorithms that allow autonomous and safe precision-landing on the Moon under any lighting conditions.
1 The ALHAT sensor suite consists of a flash LIDAR-based Hazard are applied to the raw images, including application of the precision calibration, application of the range accuracy calibration, masking of dead or intermittent pixels, application of a five-point median filter, and insertion of a header which contains various house-keeping data parameters.
III. ALHAT/Morpheus Free Flight Campaign

A. Concept of Operations
The FF10-FF14 flight profile was a 96 s-98 s trajectory from launch pad 5a to concrete pad 1 in the lower right corner of the hazard field (see Fig. 5 ), about 406 m downtrack. As shown in Fig. 2 , after a straight ascent to 245 m, the vehicle started to descend on a roughly 30
• downward slope towards the landing site. Shortly after apogee, the pitch rate had sufficiently dampened to start a 6 s mosaic scan of a 60 m × 60 m area centered on the intended landing point (ILP), at a slant range of about 460 m. The resulting LIDAR images were then assembled into a 3-D DEM and analyzed for hazards. Within ∼14 s of the start of the mosaic, the HDS computed and transmitted a list of five safe sites ranked by safety probability to the onboard GN&C system, which then diverted the vehicle landing location to the safest recommended landing location. To be accepted by the onboard vehicle safety checks, the safe site location had to be within a conservative 2 m circle of the surveyed landing pad center, otherwise the vehicle would reject the HDS solution and land on the pad center. The HDS then pointed the gimbal to track a high-relief feature in the mapped area. A correlation-based matching process determined the location of the feature in the LIDAR FOV and, if successful, provided this information as an HRN measurement to the vehicle GN&C system at 1 Hz. At 150 m slant range, the HDS was commanded to shut down, which stowed the gimbal and flash LIDAR in a safe configuration for landing and powered down the system. Note that the original concept of operations was to scan a 90 m × 90 m DEM from 750 m slant range. However, the Morpheus engine performance and fuel margins for this flight campaign only allowed a maximum slant range of 460 m. The DEM size was adapted to the achievable trajectory geometry in a way that the number of LIDAR frames needed to cover the map area stayed constant. The number of frames to assemble during DEM generation is the dominant factor driving the algorithm processing requirements. The HDS time performance demonstrated in this flight campaign implies the HDS will be able to cover the full 90 m × 90 m DEM from 750 m slant range within the timing requirements once the more capable HD5 engine (350 lbs more thrust, ∼3 % higher I sp ) has been fully flight certified.
The Morpheus GN&C system was running a dual string navigation filter, one computing a GPS/INS solution, the other fusing IMU data with the ALHAT sensor measurements. During open-loop flights, the vehicle was navigated using the GPS/INS solution and landed at the pre-determined pad center, with the ALHAT filter and HDS running in parallel for data collection. A so-called 'advanced' open-loop flight, FF12, used the GPS/INS filter for navigation but listened to the HDS safe site recommendation. Closed-loop flights used the ALHAT filter as the primary navigation solution. During the closed-loop flights, the discrepancy between both filter solutions was continuously monitored for consistency. If a safety threshold was exceeded, the filter would switch to the INS/GPS system in flight to safely land the vehicle. This switch happened in both closed-loop flights.
A summary of the overall flight performance can be found in Table 1 . 13 In what follows we describe the performance of the HDS subsystems in more detail.
A. Flash LIDAR
The maximum slant range at which the flash LIDAR was operated onboard Morpheus at KSC was approximately 470 m. 
B. Gimbal
The gimbal performance requirements differ during HD and HRN. During the HD mosaic the requirements are driven by the 50% crosstrack and 20% downtrack flash overlap fractions selected to ensure DEM coverage. Given the flash LIDAR's 1 • FOV, this translates into at least 0.5
• gimbal control error in the azimuth and 0.2
• gimbal control error in the elevation axis. 6 For all flights, these requirements were met, with the exception of the azimuth control error briefly exceeding the requirement when switching from row-to-row. This is expected behavior and does not impact the map. During HRN, the gimbal needs to track the feature well enough to ensure it stays within the image search region, resulting in a required maximum control error of 0.25
• . This was met easily during FF10-FF13. During the closed loop flights, the control error exceeded the requirements during discrete disturbances, in particular the in-flight filter switch in FF13 and the filter corrections after processing the HRN updates in FF14, but showed similar good steady-state performance as in the open-loop flights.
C. Navigation
The HDS navigation system uses the HDS IMU to provide HDS position, velocity, and attitude estimates of the HDS body frame with respect to an internally computed map frame at 400 Hz (see Figs. 2-4) . The HDS navigation system is bootstrapped to the 50 Hz navigation state provided by the host vehicle, except during gimbal mosaics where bootstrapping is suspended to ensure a smooth pose estimate without discontinuities due to filter updates. During the mosaic, the HDS navigation system is propagating the navigation state open loop. Note that no filtering of the HV navigation solution or HDS IMU noise nor estimation of IMU biases is attempted, so that accurate alignment between the two systems, both in space and in time, is of critical importance. In flight, this period of open-loop (internal) propagation lasted ∼6 s. The drift between HV and HDS navigation states is of great interest, because errors in the HDS solution during this time will manifest as distortions in the HazDet DEM. This drift is caused by several parameters, such as errors in the initial state at the start of the mosaic, e.g., due to actual navigation errors or time lag, IMU noise and biases, and misalignments. The maximum position drift was less than ∼0.9 m per axis (mostly downrange). The drift rate for the last two (closed-loop) flights was distinctly smaller than for the first three flights. We estimate that the drift rate during the closed-loop flights approaches the limit of what is achievable without explicit in-flight bias or misalignment estimation. 
D. DEM Generation
The ability to reconstruct the scanned terrain surface into a high fidelity DEM is critical to the subsequent processes that characterize that surface in terms of features hazardous to the lander. The features in the terrain become hazardous, in turn, as a function of the lander mechanical characteristics and the dynamics of the touchdown event. DEM quality thus primarily refers to the fidelity with which the reconstructed terrain models the actual terrain. Several basic aspects need to be considered and evaluated. These include imaging the intended terrain patch, placing the DEM correctly in 3-D space, understanding and dealing with the uncertainties in range measurements, mosaicking with minimal misleading artifacts, prevention of gaps, other sources of noise, navigation dynamics, and so on. In order to evaluate the quality of the DEMs, a survey of the hazard field was conducted prior to the helicopter test and data collection campaign early in 2012. 7 The resulting reference DEM is shown in Fig. 5 . The hazard field has been adjusted and modified during the Morpheus/ALHAT free flight test campaign to ensure pad 1 was the safest site (dictated by vehicle safety and post-flight accessibility concerns) and thus, the flight LIDAR DEMs are not directly comparable in their entirety to the surveyed data. Table 2 summarizes basic metrics that can be computed when comparing the flight DEMs to the reference DEM. One aspect of LIDAR DEM quality is the elevation map density. To maximize that, the mosaic plan implements a 50% overlap crossrange and 20% overlap downrange. At 0.1 m resolution, the LIDAR DEMs achieve greater than 99% density. The small gaps in the LIDAR DEMs are expected from rock and crater shadows due to the nominal 30
• trajectory path angle at the time of the mosaicking process. The choice of 50-20 overlap fractions is due to real-time considerations, where a 50-50 overlap fractions would result in more evenly distributed noise over the LIDAR DEM. Another aspect of DEM quality refers to the uncertainty in the LIDAR DEM elevations. This uncertainty is propagated from the LIDAR sensor range precision capability. From LIDAR sensor calibration efforts, the expected range precision is 0.08 m for a front-toparallel surface. The noise component for the near flat and slightly inclined underlying surface of the hazard field terrain observed with a 30
• path angle is half of that, or 0.04 m. Table 2 indicates that this expectation was met during FF10, FF11, and FF13. To measure these, we considered the area covered by the concrete pad installed in safe zone 1. The true pad surface is known to be flat and level and consequently, the standard deviation of elevations there is a reasonable metric for the elevation uncertainty associated with the flight DEMs. Fig. 6 illustrates details of the pad surface, a close-up useful to appreciate the quality of the LIDAR DEMs. The mean of these surface pixels is compared, also in Table 2 , to the ground truth elevation of 1.3 m. The last aspect of quality is reflected by the measured flatness (planarity) and levelness (orientation) of the pad surface in the LIDAR DEMs. A flat level plane has zero planarity and zero levelness. Planarity refers to deviation from a plane, and levelness refers to angular deviation from horizontal. Given the gridded elevations 1) LIDAR DEMs are analyzed at the scale of the lander, i.e., with the highest spatial fidelity. 2) Hazard assessment is based on the mechanical tolerances of the lander, specifically, effective slope and effective roughness. Subsequent text refers to slope meaning effective slope and the same for roughness. Slope is assessed deterministically while roughness is assessed probabilistically. Slope and roughness hazards are combined into a probabilistic hazard map that describes the probability of hazardness, or inversely, the probability of safety.
Leg-Pad Maps
The purpose of the leg-pad map (see example in Fig. 9(a) ) is to pre-compute the position in space of the lander's footpads, assuming that the touchdown dynamics does not result in crushed rocks or pads sinking into soft soil. It also assumes that the pads are rigid. Pre-computing the location of the pads allows the computation (rather than estimation) of effective slope. Morpheus pads are small (0.25 m diameter). The plane-fit method would give up to 2
• slope uncertainty for a lander that size (3.4 m diameter). Because the HDS also computes 3-pixel and 5-pixel median-filtered DEMs (to reduce flash LIDAR artifacts in HRN processing) it was determined that the 3x3 median-filtered DEM was an appropriate candidate for leg-pad maps.
Effective Slope Maps
Effective slope is calculated using the leg-pad maps. For all possible placements of the lander pads (the fourth is either on the surface or elevated) the worst slope is taken for each pixel every 1 m. For expediency only the placements deviating 10
• from the lander heading were considered rather than the full 45
• span. For Morpheus the slope tolerance for hazard assessment is 10
• . For context, only rocks taller than 0.6 m would induce slopes greater than 10
• and that represents less than 5% risk for the entire DEM. The 1 m resolution slope map for FF11 is shown in Fig. 9(b) . Red pixels mark areas that exceed Morpheus's slope tolerance. As in previous plots, the selected safe sites are also illustrated to indicate that none is located on a slope hazard. Recall that these measurements are made at the scale of the lander. Therefore each pixel (1 m 2 ) encodes safety for the entire lander (3.4 m diameter.)
Effective Full Roughness Maps
Roughness estimation is determined probabilistically by assessing the chance that a roughness measure represents a hazardous condition. By examining at each pixel and all the surrounding pixels under the lander (full roughness) the largest deviation from the lander bottom to all possible slope planes for that pixel, the chance that there is a roughness hazard under the lander is assessed in conjunction with the associated elevation uncertainties of those pixels. As with slope hazard assessment, the estimates are computed 1 m apart but based on the full resolution DEM data. The roughness maps presented below, therefore, have a 1 m resolution. For convenience, the roughness maps are represented by inverse roughness (denoting lack of roughness, or safety), and incorporate in the assessment the landers mechanical tolerance to roughness, which is 0.4 m for Morpheus. The roughness hazard map for FF11 is illustrated in Fig. 9(c) . The color scale indicates an arbitrary safety probability of 0.7 or better. As before, the safe landing sites are illustrated to indicate that they are located in safe areas.
Safety Probability Maps
Roughness probability maps and slope maps are combined into a hazard probability map. To take into account navigation uncertainty (1 m, 1-σ) the hazard probability map is convolved with a Gaussian filter with space constant 1 m. The results are attenuated safety probability maps where the site selection algorithm looks for safe landing sites. See Fig. 9(d) for the example safety map for FF11. As before, the top five safe sites are illustrated to indicate the safety of the sites in green areas and away from hazards.
Safe Site Selection, Evaluation and Verification
The safe site selection algorithm applies a morphological dome operator to detect all the regional maxima in the surface represented by the safety map. The peaks in the regional maxima are true unambiguous peaks, i.e., all the pixel neighbors have values smaller than the peak value. To prevent multiple peaks from match is computed with subpixel accuracy using biquadratic interpolation of the correlation surface. Each match is then evaluated against quality metrics on the correlation scores, the measurement covariance, and the correlation peak quality (sharpness) before being passed to the host vehicle. The HRN measurements the host vehicle receives include the map location of the surface feature being tracked, the location of the surface feature relative to the HDS, in a sensor-fixed reference frame, and the uncertainty of the HDS-relative feature position. Note that in flight the decreasing slant range to the landing site results in an increasing mismatch between map and image resolution, or, equivalently, a smaller and smaller LIDAR footprint in the map. This, together with the limited depth of field of the LIDAR eventually precludes successful HRN measurements as the vehicle approaches the landing site. Due to the short trajectories, no re-mosaicing steps to create finer resolution maps in flight was executed. Table 1 summarizes the HRN performance for FF10-FF14. The number of measurement attempts denotes the number of 1 Hz flash LIDAR images considered for HRN. The number of feasible attempts denotes range frames that have sufficient spatial extent for constructing a template for matching. Finally, the number of valid measurements count those attempts where the template was successfully correlated to the HD DEM, the sub-pixel location of the correlation peak could be computed, and the match met all quality criteria.
The ALHAT/Morpheus free flight campaign provided the first opportunity to test the various improvements of the HRN algorithm implemented in the wake of the 2012 helicopter tests under dynamic conditions. Changes included bug fixes to the feature selection algorithm, increased robustness of the correlation algorithm to missing data, improvements to the DEM quality, and overall greatly increased pointing accuracy and stability. As expected, the free flights revealed a number of new issues that were addressed after post-flight analyses and corrected between flights. These included tuning the HRN feature search region, improved numerical conditioning of range image pre-processing, degraded range image quality due to aerosols or erroneous pixels, and the interaction of HRN measurements with the ALHAT navigation filter.
Since over the course of the campaign several important changes had been implemented in the HRN algorithm, all flights were post-processed with the HRN software flown in FF14, which more than doubled the number of valid measurements (see Fig. 11(a) ). Visual inspection of all reprojected feature vectors in the LIDAR images demonstrated that the feature was correctly matched (see Fig. 11(b) ). Unfortunately, even the latest updates flown in FF14 only yielded two valid HRN measurements. This low number was due to the fact that the feature drifted outside of the search region after HRN measurements were processed by the Morpheus navigation filter. This finding motivated a revision of the HRN measurement simulator and measurement model, and an exhaustive simulation campaign using flight and simulated data. For the upcoming flight campaign, several modifications to LIDAR operations (to mitigate spurious LIDAR pixels), to the flight rules (to avoid wind-blown plume and dust in LIDAR imagery a ), and to the vehicle navigation filter (to reduce feature drift) have been implemented.
V. Conclusion
The 2014 free flight campaign of the ALHAT sensor suite on Morpheus marked NASA's first flight demonstration of a real-time hazard detection system and demonstrated full operability of the ALHAT sensor suite on a relevant, lunar-like trajectory with realistic flight dynamics and landing terrain. The HDS performed DEM generation, hazard detection, and hazard relative navigation within the timing requirements, and produced five truly safe sites in every flight, the safest of which was always on the landing pad as desired for vehicle safety. Several updates were made to the HRN algorithm during the campaign to address and mitigate anomalies experienced in flight. These updates have been tested in flight and in post-processing. In all, the flight campaign demonstrated for the first time autonomous precision-landing and hazard avoidance abilities on a NASA rocket-powered vehicle, advancing ALHAT technology to TRL 6 and underscoring its readiness for infusion into future flight missions.
